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PREDATORY INNOVATION: AN
ANALYSIS OF ALLIED ORTHOPEDIC V.

TYco IN THE CONTEXT OF SECTION 2
JURISPRUDENCE
JonathanJacobson, Scott Sher, and Edward Holman*
I. Introduction

Innovation

is at the core of the American economy. It drives
our progress and growth. Indeed, the American legal and
regulatory system is designed to protect and promote innovation,
with the government's hand guiding innovation in areas as
diverse as the patent laws, tax regulation, and the appropriations
process. But not all "innovation" is beneficial. Some conduct
that is claimed to be innovation is not innovation at all, but
instead is intended to be exclusionary. For example, a drug maker
might develop a chewable version of a prescription medication to
prevent generic substitutions. Or a surgical device maker might
redesign its product to make third-party peripherals
incompatible.
In such cases, the purported innovation either does not
improve the product in any material way or offers only a small
benefit, and leads to the exclusion of rivals. Where a product
redesign is meant to impede competition, entrench a dominant
firm's position in the market, or artificially change the structure
of the market so as to make it more difficult for new entrants to
succeed (and without corresponding benefits to consumer
welfare), "innovation" should be discouraged and may be
unlawful predatory conduct under antitrust laws.'
* Jonathan Jacobson and Scott Sher are partners in the antitrust practice
group at Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati. Edward Holman is an associate
in the same practice group.
I See Philip J. Weiser, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S.
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For purposes of the antitrust laws, predation is defined as
"conduct which has the purpose and effect of advancing the
actor's competitive position, not by improving the actor's market
performance, but by threatening to injure or injuring actual or
potential competitors, so as to drive or keep them out of the
market, or force them to compete less effectively."2 Predation
should be illegal under the antitrust laws where, on balance, it
harms customers more than it benefits them.
Predation comes in different flavors: most commonly,
courts consider predation through pricing schemes designed to
impede competition ("predatory pricing"). But predation also
occurs outside the pricing context, where firms use non-pricing
practices - including redesign, advertising, and product
preannouncements - to entrench a firm's dominant market
position by raising rivals' costs, while producing little or no
corresponding benefits to consumer welfare.
The focus of this paper is on predatory or exclusionary
behavior related to redesign or "innovation." While innovation
generates significant procompetitive benefits, courts must be
sensitive to dominant firms' ability to use purported "innovation"
as a means to secure market dominance or impede competition in
complementary markets, without any material benefit to
consumers. In such instances, this type of conduct is exclusionary
or predatory and violates the Sherman Act.
Predatory innovation may violate Section 2 of the
Sherman Act,' or the Federal Trade Commission may regulate
such behavior under Section 5 of the FTC Act.4 Thus, for
predation claims, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the
defendant is a monopolist extending or preserving its monopoly
power, or using its monopoly position in one market to gain
market power in an adjacent market.5
The D.C. Circuit Court's decision in United States v.
Dept. of Justice, Remarks as Prepared for Silicon Flatirons Center Digital
Broadband Migration Conference: Examining the Internet's Ecosystem 10
(Jan. 31, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/254806.pdf ("The
harder challenges for antitrust enforcers are to address and remedy efforts to
squelch the development of more nascent disruptive entrants.").
2 LAWRENCE
ANTHONY
ANTITRUST 108 (1977).
3

15 U.S.C.

4

Id. § 45.

SULLIVAN,

HANDBOOK

OF

THE LAW

OF

§ 2.

s See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 50-51, 80-81
(D.C. Cir. 2001) (analyzing alleged predatory innovation under the rubrics of
monopolization and attempted monopolization claims).
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Microsoft Corp.6 sets forth the appropriate framework for
determining when "innovation" becomes exclusionary or
predatory conduct that violates the antitrust laws. As discussed
below, courts should "properly [be] very skeptical" about antitrust
claims arising from a dominant firm's product design changes,
particularly in technology markets where products are constantly
changing.' Yet, predatory and exclusionary redesign exists, and
such activity should not be presumptively shielded from antitrust
review simply because it concerns "innovation."' The facts of
Microsoft, as well as the FTC's complaint in Intel, show how
monopolists can use predation as a strategy to protect a monopoly
from competition. 9 When implemented, predatory redesign can
be harmful to competition.
Predatory redesign becomes even more dangerous in
network markets, such as for software and hardware, for several
reasons. First, lock-in, network, winner-takes-all, and similar
effects, together with low marginal costs, can amplify the
conduct's anticompetitive effects.10 Second, in such markets, a
would-be monopolist's position may be strengthened by the
intellectual property rights it holds." Although changing design
or updating patented or copyrighted products remain rightsholder choices - as is the bundling of two different products rights may be exploited to raise barriers to entry and to exclude
competition.12
The relevant inquiry in determining whether predatory
conduct violates antitrust law is whether, on balance, the
redesign at issue is likely to result in harm to consumers through
reduced output, lower quality, or higher prices (or higher qualityadjusted prices). Although courts may appropriately presume

6

253 F.3d 34.

See id. at 65.
8

See id.

* Id. at 64-67, 74-78; Complaint, Intel Corp., Docket No. 9341, It 56-61,
80-91 (F.T.C. Dec. 16, 2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjprold9341/
091216intelcmpt.pdf.
'0 Maria LillA Montagnani, Predatory and Exclusionary Innovation:
Which Legal Standard for Software Integration in the Context of the
Competition versus Intellectual Property Rights Clash?, 37 INT'L REV.
INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 304, 305 (2006); see also Carlos Acufia-

Quiroga, PredatoryInnovation: A Step Beyond? (Understanding Competition
in High-technology Markets), 15 INT'L REV. L. COMPUTERS & TECH. 7, 12-13

(2001).
" See Montagnani, supra note 10 at 305-06.
12 Id.
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that innovation is procompetitive in the first instance, courts
should not shield purported innovation that is on balance
exclusionary from the ambit of the antitrust laws. In that regard,
the decision in Microsoft set forth the correct framework: the
burden rests with the plaintiff to establish a primafacie case of
predation; the defendant then has the opportunity to offer
justifications to rebut an established prima facie case; and
ultimately the plaintiff has the burden to demonstrate that the
proffered justification is outweighed by the exclusionary effect of
the redesign." On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Allied Orthopedic v. Tyco - which established a per se rule
protecting redesign - was a significant departure from the normal
standards employed to determine whether a product redesign is
predatory and may encourage anticompetitive behavior.14
Particularly in the Ninth Circuit - the home to Silicon Valley the decision could have enormous consequences.
Additionally, other tests, analogous to the Allied
Orthopedic decision - including the "profit sacrifice test" and the
"no economic sense test" - are also inappropriate measures to
judge whether product redesign is predatory or exclusionary
(although these tests are preferable to the Allied Orthopedic test
of per se legality). On the one hand, the profit sacrifice test will
generate false positives, because innovation and redesign are
themselves profit sacrifices and, of course, should not be
punished."s On the other hand, both the no economic sense test
and the profit sacrifice test will generate false negatives because,
as described in detail below, both tests focus exclusively upon
whether the defendant's conduct cost the defendant more than
the benefits the conduct provided to the defendant, thus ignoring
harm to consumer 'velfare."
Part II of this article summarizes the Allied Orthopedic
decision and the test applied by the Ninth Circuit in that case.
Part III explains how certain product design changes can have an
adverse effect on competition. Part IV summarizes several other
prominent cases challenging innovation as predatory or
exclusionary. Finally, Part V describes and evaluates three
alternative predatory innovation tests and concludes that the
" Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 58-59.
14 592

F.3d 991 (9th Cir. 2010).
" See, e.g., Steven C. Salop, Exclusionary Conduct, Effect on Consumers,
and the Flawed Profit-SacrificeStandard, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 311, 314 (2006).
'6 See generally id. (criticizing both tests and advocating a test focused on
consumer welfare).
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Microsoft balancing test is the appropriate standard.
II. The Decision in Allied Orthopedic InappropriatelyShields
Anticompetitive Predationfrom Antitrust Review
In Allied Orthopedic Appliances, Inc. v. Tyco Health Care
Group, the Ninth Circuit rejected the balancing test articulated
by the D.C. Circuit in United States v. Microsoft Corp. as a
means to determine whether product changes violate the antitrust
laws. The Allied Orthopedic court held that "[t]here is no room in
th[e] analysis for balancing the benefits or worth of a product
improvement against its anticompetitive effects."" The court
reasoned that "[i]f a monopolist's design change is an
improvement, it is 'necessarily tolerated by the antitrust laws,"'
per se.'8 In casting aside the Microsoft balancing test, the court
held that "[t]o weigh the benefits of an improved product design
against the resulting injuries to competitors is not just unwise, it
is unadministrable."' 9
In Allied Orthopedic, a group of hospitals and other health
care providers sued Tyco Health Care Group (Tyco) for allegedly
violating Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.2 0 Tyco was an
early entrant into the pulse oximetry market, which includes
sensors and monitors that read and display a patient's level of
blood oxygenation, and as such established a large installed base
of monitors.21 Tyco's technology was protected by its "R-Cal"
patent through November 2003, which gave it the exclusive right
to sell sensors compatible with its monitors.22 Tyco expected that
as soon as its patent expired, competitors would sell generic
In
replacement sensors compatible with its monitors."
anticipation of the expiration of the R-Cal patent, Tyco
developed new, patented monitors and sensors that provided new
features such as a writable memory chip on the sensor and a more
efficient method for calibrating the sensors. The new monitors,
however, were incompatible with generic sensors.2 4
The plaintiffs alleged that Tyco violated Section 2 of the
Allied Orthopedic, 592 F.3d at 1000.
" Id. (quoting Foremost Pro Color, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 703 F.2d
534, 545 (9th Cir. 1983)).
17

19 Id.
20
21
22
23
24

Id at 994.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Sherman Act by unlawfully maintaining its monopoly power over
the sensor market by redesigning its monitors and sensors, and
also alleged violations of Section 1 related to Tyco's bundling and
exclusive dealing. 25 As to the Section 2 claim, the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the district court's ruling that Tyco's redesign of its
pulse oximetry monitors and sensors did not violate Section 2.26
Specifically, the court held that a product design change that in
some way improves a product does not violate Section 2 unless
associated with some separate anticompetitive conduct. 27
Additionally, while the plaintiffs argued that the benefits of any
product redesign should be weighed against its anticompetitive
effects, the court concluded that such a balancing test would be
unwise and unadministrable.2 8
The court further held that there was undisputed evidence
that Tyco's product redesign was an unequivocal "improvement,"
and that the new sensor's more efficient calibration process
allowed Tyco to introduce new types of sensors without requiring
its customers to purchase new monitors or reprogram existing
monitors." The court's rationale gave substantial weight to the
fact that the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office had granted Tyco
a patent: "the existence of a patent on a new product design is
some evidence that the change is an improvement over previous
designs."" While the court did not go so far as to conclude that
the grant of a patent itself was sufficient to immunize a redesign
from antitrust scrutiny, it afforded the patent process
considerable deference.'
The plaintiffs also presented evidence of statements that
allegedly showed Tyco hoped the product redesign would block
entry by generic sensor manufacturers.3 2 The court held that
"[s]tatements of an innovator's intent to harm a competitor
through genuine product improvement are insufficient by
themselves to create a jury question under Section 2."
Id. at 998.
Id.
27 Id.
25
26

28

Id.

21

Id. at 1000-01.

3o Id.
11 See id. One significant question is whether the court would have
provided the same level of deference to, for example, the approval of a product
design change filed with the FDA, where such changes require FDA approval
but do not necessarily mean that the filer "improved" the product.
"Id. at 1001.
3 Id. (citing Oahu Gas Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Res., Inc., 838 F.2d 360, 368-69
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The court also found that Tyco did not use its market
power to force consumers to purchase its new sensors and
monitors.3 4 Specifically, the court found that, while Tyco did
discontinue its previous line of monitors, other monitor
manufacturers were effectively competing in the market.s
Additionally, the court reasoned that Tyco was under no
obligation to make its new monitors compatible with the older
sensors because "a monopolist has no duty to help its competitors
survive or expand when introducing an improved product
design." 6 Thus, the court held that Tyco's product redesign did
not violate Section 2 because it was an undisputed improvement
and Tyco did not use its monopoly power to force its new product
on consumers.3 7
The Allied Orthopedic test is problematic. Although in
that case the facts may not have supported a finding of predation,
the Ninth Circuit articulated a test that shields all redesign under
the guise of "innovation," no matter how minimal its benefits may
be, no matter whether it is predatory in design and effect, and no
matter its ultimate impact on market prices, output, or quality.
There is ample historical basis to conclude that not all so-called
innovation benefits consumer welfare and is therefore
undeserving of blanket protection from antitrust scrutiny.
III. Product Design Changes Can Be Predatoryand/or
Exclusionary
Courts naturally and appropriately are skeptical of claims
that innovation has harmed the competitive process because the
economic benefits of innovation are obvious. Nevertheless,
various examples demonstrate how firms use "innovation" as a
pretext to gain or maintain market position.
Predatory redesign is the most significant among claims of
anticompetitive "innovation." Predatory redesign occurs where a
firm changes the nature of its product in an effort to exclude its
competitors. In the broadest sense, there are two types of
One type is where the defendant
predatory redesign.
(9th Cir. 1998)).
34

Id. at 1002.

Id. Tyco's share of new monitor sales in the U.S. dropped to 35% by
2006; the leading generic's sales rose to 45% by the following year. Id.
6 Id. (citing Foremost Pro Color, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 703 F.2d
534, 545 (9th Cir. 1983)).
3 Id.
3

8
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intentionally creates an incompatibility to make it more difficult
for competitors to interoperate with its products, indirectly
achieving a competitive edge in the market. In such instances,
the justification for the redesign is pretextual. The other type of
redesign is exclusionary, but not necessarily "predatory." The
redesign's ancillary effect is to make it more difficult for
competitors to compete. In such instances, the justification for
the redesign is not pretextual. This distinction is important:
purely "predatory" redesigns are likely anticompetitive, whereas
"exclusionary" redesigns usually are not. However, merely
offering a product improvement does not end the inquiry. Any
The
redesign can be characterized as an improvement.
magnitude of that improvement must be weighed against its
effect on consumer welfare; in other words, the exclusionary
impact must be measured." Where the exclusion is sufficiently
large, and the improvement is minimal, the exclusion should be
condemned, even if not entirely predatory."
There are two scenarios where an exclusionary redesign
may be especially harmful: (a) in the, context of networked
markets, where the redesign creates a strategic incompatibility
such that providers of complementary products are "locked out"
or foreclosed from interoperating with the dominant firm's
platform; and (b) in pharmaceutical markets, where firms
"redesign" drugs in order to extend the period of patent exclusion
such that generics cannot introduce alternatives in the market.
In a networked market, such as the PC operating system
("OS"), the ability for third parties to "hook" into the Microsoft
Windows OS is essential to work within the environment. Given
Windows' market share, and the lock-in created by its large
application developer network, Microsoft's OS market position is
relatively secure.4 0 Microsoft could "redesign" or "innovate" on its
OS in one of two ways that could raise antitrust concerns. First,
Microsoft could create an incompatibility that makes it more
difficult for applications to interoperate with the platform.
Second, Microsoft could incorporate the functionality provided
by a third-party application within Windows and thereby either
partially, or completely, make the need for that third-party
application obsolete.
In regard to incompatibility, the relevant antitrust
* Salop, supra note 15, at 331 (advocating a test focused on consumer
welfare).
39 See id.
40 See Acufia-Quiroga, supra note 10, at 14.
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question is whether the incompatibility is necessary to facilitate a
product improvement (or needed to avoid unnecessary costs). If,
keeping with the Microsoft example, the change enhances
network security and that redesign has the ancillary effect of
foreclosing a third-party application from working within the
improvement is
not
environment
that
Windows
an
change
only
relates
to
anticompetitive. In contrast, if the
aesthetic change, such as the placement of the Windows logo, and
has the effect of foreclosing some third-party application, the
change is pretextual and effects a marginal improvement in
product quality that is greatly outweighed by its exclusionary
effect, and thus should be subject to antitrust review.
In regard to technological integration, the relevant inquiry
is whether the integration - or technical tie - represents a true

integration, or instead represents a "bolting" of one product onto
the other. The integration of the hard drive into the PC is one
example of an improvement through technological consolidation:
the integration of the drive allows for significant cost-savings in
manufacturing, which improves the price-to-performance ratio
for consumers. On the other hand, the inclusion of a software
media player into the OS is a closer call. The Court of First
Instance in Europe, looking at that issue in its Microsoft decision,
analyzed the extent to which the media player and OS had
separate demand, and whether there was true intermingling of
software code between the OS and the media player.4 1 In the
opinion of the European Commission ("EC"), there was
insufficient intermingling of the OS software code with the media
player to justify the technological tie - in other words, there was
no true "integration," the media player was simply "bolted" to the
OS.4 2 At the same time, the effect of such integration (again, in
the opinion of the EC), was to materially impede the development
of the media player market, without corresponding consumer
benefit. 43 This sort of "redesign" is more ambivalent (indeed, in
the United States, the Department of Justice did not challenge
this conduct), and requires a balancing of the benefit versus its
harm.
In pharmaceutical markets, there is also concern about
predatory redesign. One notable case was challenged by the

41 Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm'n of the Eur. Cmtys., 2007
E.C.R. 11-03601, 1 164-70, 1 1205-10.
42 Id. at
204-05.
4"

Id. at

205.
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FTC.4 4 In January 2000, Warner Chilcott acquired Ovcon 35
("Ovcon"), a branded oral contraceptive, from Bristol-Myers
Ovcon was not subject to any patent
Squibb ("BMS"). 4 5
46
In September 2001, Barr filed an application with
protection.
the FDA for approval to make and sell a generic version of
Ovcon. 47 Barr planned to sell generic Ovcon at a 30 percent
discount compared to the branded product.48 Barr publicly
announced its intention to market generic Ovcon by the end of
2003.49 Warner Chilcott considered the Barr generic to be the
"biggest risk to the company."5 0 Warner Chilcott expected that
Barr's generic would capture at least 50 percent of Ovcon's new
prescriptions within the first year and cause a significant decline
in Ovcon revenues."
The FTC alleged that, to protect these revenues from
generic competition, Warner Chilcott planned a "switch" strategy,
whereby the company would introduce a chewable form of the
drug before generic entry occurred.52 Warner Chilcott's strategy,
the complaint states, was to convert its customers to Ovcon
Chewable and to stop selling Ovcon." As a result, prescriptions
for Ovcon Chewable would not be replaceable with generic
Ovcon without express approval of the patient's physician.5 4
Although Warner Chilcott claimed that the redesign
benefited customers, namely that customers preferred chewable
birth control, the FTC found that justification pretextual and
that the so-called "innovation" was merely a redesign that was
44 FTC v. Warner Chilcott Holdings Co., No. 1:05-cv-02179-CKK (D.D.C.
available
at
23,
2006),
Oct.
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0410034/finalorder.pdf; see also Abbott Labs. v.
Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. (In re Tricor Antitrust Litigation), 432 F. Supp. 2d
408 (D. Del. 2006) (summarized in Part IV.H, infra); Walgreen Co. v.
AstraZeneca Pharms., 534 F. Supp. 2d 146 (D.D.C. 2008) (involving allegations
that Defendant switched the market for prescription heartburn medication in
order to prevent generic entry).
45 Complaint for Injunctive and Other Equitable Relief, FTC v. Warner
Chilcott Holdings Co., No. 1:05-cv-02179-CKK
28 (D.D.C. Nov. 7, 2005),
availableat http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0410034/051107comp0410034.pdf.
46 Id.
47 Id. at
33.
48

Id. at 35.
at 34.

4 Id.
5o Id.

at
st Id. at
52 Id. at
53 Id.
54

Id.

41.
38.
39.
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intended to exclude competition in the market; Warner Chilcott
subsequently abandoned the practice pursuant to an agreed-upon.
consent decree with the FTC.ss Under the Ninth Circuit's
decision in Allied Orthopedic, however, such an arguably minor
improvement would go unexamined and be lawful, even if its
effect and intention was to exclude competition.
IV. Significant Cases Addressing the Issue of Whether Innovation
Violates the Antitrust Laws
Few cases have challenged innovation as predatory or
exclusionary.
However, the prominent cases in this area
demonstrate the concern with the Allied Orthopedic decision. In
several of the cases described below, including Microsoft, Tricor,
and Bard, the monopolists charged with predation engaged in
conduct that cost little and created marginal,, yet suspect,
improvements that significantly harmed consumer welfare. If
each of these cases had been viewed through the lens of the Allied
Orthopedic test, the conduct likely would have been judged legal,
even though in each instance the harm to consumer welfare was
evident. Conversely, application of a rule-of-reason or consumer
welfare balancing test (with the appropriate deference paid to
innovative efforts) likely would have yielded the correct results in
each of these cases without the concern that the test would be
"unadministrable," as feared by the Ninth Circuit in Allied
Orthopedic.
A. C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Systems, Inc.56
In C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Systems, Inc., C.R. Bard ("Bard")
sued M3 Systems ("M3") for allegedly infringing Bard's patents
on a tissue sampling gun for biopsies, and the needles that were
compatible with the gun.s" M3 defended on the grounds that the
patents 'were invalid and not infringed, and countersued for
fraud, patent misuse, and antitrust violations." The sampling
gun at issue was designed to allow a single physician to perform a
tissue biopsy.59 Prior to the invention of the sampling gun, two
" Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Consumers Win as FTC Action
Results
in
Generic
Ovcon . Launch
(Oct.
23,
2006),
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2006/10/chilcott.shtm.
56 C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Systems, Inc., 157 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
s1 Id. at 1346.
58 Id.
19 Id. at 1347.
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physicians were typically required: one to manipulate the needles,
and one to operate an ultrasound device used to guide the
insertion of the needles.60 The sampling gun was twice revised by
its inventors to make it easier to use.61
The case was tried before a jury, which ruled in favor of
M3 on every issue.62 Specifically, the jury ruled that the two
patents at issue were both invalid and not infringed, that Bard
committed fraud on the Patent and Trademark Office in
obtaining the'patents, that Bard misused the patents, and that
Bard violated the antitrust laws. The Federal Circuit affirmed
the invalidity of one patent and reversed the invalidity of the
other, but affirmed the ruling of noninfringement of the latter. 64
The court also reversed the judgments of fraud and misuse, but
affirmed the antitrust judgment.6 s
Regarding the antitrust counterclaims, M3 alleged that
Bard had modified its sampling gun and needles so that M3's
identical. needles would not work with Bard's sampling gun
without the aid of an adapter.6 6 The jury issued special verdicts
finding that there was a relevant market for replacement needles
for tissue sampling guns, that Bard had monopoly power in that
market, and that Bard used restrictive or exclusionary conduct to
maintain or acquire its monopoly power. 67 The Federal Circuit
held that in order for M3 to prevail, M3 had to show that Bard
modified its sampling gun for predatory reasons, rather than to
improve the gun's operation. 68 The court, in finding sufficient
evidence to sustain the jury's verdict, cited two internal Bard
documents: one that showed that the modifications had no effect
on the performance of the gun or needles, and another that
showed that the use of third-party needles could not possibly
injure patients or physicians. 69 The court reasoned:
[A]lthough Bard contended at trial that it modified its
Biopsy gun to make it easier to load and unload, there
was substantial evidence that Bard's real reasons for
60

Id.

61

Id. at 1347-48.
Id. at 1346.

62
63
64
65

Id.
Id.
Id.

67

Id. at 1369.
Id. at 1382.

68

Id.

69

Id.

66
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modifying the gun were to raise the cost of entry to
potential makers of replacement needles, to make
doctors apprehensive about using non-Bard needles,
and the preclude the use of 'copycat' needles.o
Although the Bard court did not articulate a "balancing
test" for determining whether such conduct violated the antitrust
laws, the decision squarely focused on whether, on balance,
Bard's conduct would harm customers, even though it was
undisputed that the "innovation" did marginally improve the
Bard product.
B. CaliforniaComputer Products,Inc. v. IBM Corp.n
In California Computer Products, Inc. v. IBM Corp.,
California Computer Products ("CalComp") sued IBM for
monopolization and attempted monopolization of various
computer disk product markets.72 Specifically, CalComp alleged
that IBM violated the antitrust laws by cutting prices on
computer peripheral products, redesigning products, and raising
The
prices on central processing unit ("CPU") products.
products at issue primarily involved computer peripheral disk
products that connect to a CPU, either in a combined system or
as external components that plug into the CPU.74
As to the product redesign claims, CalComp alleged that
IBM changed the designs of its disk drives, CPUs, and controllers
solely for the purpose of inhibiting competition from IBMcompatible third-party disk drive manufacturers." Specifically,
CalComp's claims revolved around IBM's decision to integrate
its disk drive controller into one of its CPUs. 6 CalComp claimed
that this integration did not improve performance and served
only to cause compatibility issues with its products; however, the
Ninth Circuit held that there was uncontroverted evidence that
this integration was a cost-saving step that allowed IBM to lower
prices for its products." Notably, the court held that "price and
performance are inseparable parts of any competitive offering;
70 Id.

" Cal. Computer Prods. v. IBM Corp., 613 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1979).
72 Id. at 731.
73 Id.
74

Id.

71 Id.

at 739.
Id. at 743.
" Id. at 744.
76
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and equivalent function at lower cost certainly represents a
superior product from the buyer's point of view." 8 The court
reasoned:
IBM, assuming it was a monopolist, had the right to
redesign its products to make them more attractive to
buyers whether by reason of lower manufacturing cost
and price or improved performance. It was under no
duty to help CalComp or other peripheral equipment
manufacturers survive or expand. IBM need not have
provided its rivals with disk products to examine and
copy. . . , nor have constricted its product development
The
so as to facilitate sales of rival products.
reasonableness of IBM's conduct in this regard did not
present a jury issue. 9
Thus, the court held that the district court's directed verdict in
favor of IBM on the product redesign issue was appropriate.so
CalComp did not articulate a balancing test, and this
decision formed the basis of the Ninth Circuit's decision in Allied
Orthopedic. The Allied Orthopedic decision, however, goes much
further than the CalComp holding requires. CalComp specifically
looked to the "reasonableness" of IBM's decision to integrate its
hard drive into the computer."
The court did not shield all
claims of innovation from antitrust liability regardless of its
purpose and impact on the market. Indeed, in looking to the
effects of the redesign, the CalComp court strongly suggested that
a balancing test would be more appropriate. 82
C. TransamericaComputer Co. v. IBM Corp."
Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp. involved much
of the same conduct as CalComp and the Ninth Circuit affirmed
the district court's decision in favor of IBM with regard to its
design changes based primarily on the authority of the prior
decision.8 4
One additional design change contested by
Id.
7 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id.
78

82

See id.

I Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., 698 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir.
1983).
84 Id. See also Memorex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 636 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir.
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Transamerica Computer ("Transamerica") was IBM's redesign of
two of its smallest CPUs. 5 These CPUs included a channel for
attaching slower speed devices, but were engineered such that
The
they were incompatible with third-party peripherals. 6
district court found that this conduct unreasonably restricted
competition because the only reason for IBM's design choice was
to make third-party storage drives, which were faster than IBM's
own drives, incompatible with the IBM computer.
Nevertheless, the district court did not award Transamerica
damages; the court found that IBM did not possess monopoly
power in the relevant market, and it found that Transamerica did
not suffer any damages, because the market for the excluded
products was insignificant." The Ninth Circuit affirmed this
result, holding that the district court's finding that Transamerica
did not suffer any damages attributable to the design change was
not clearly erroneous.89 Although not necessary to the holding,
the Ninth Circuit reiterated what it had held five years earlier in
CalComp, namely that because "the contested changes were
improvements in the products, [and] were not unreasonably
restrictive of competition," they did not violate the Sherman
Act.90
D. Innovation DataProcessing,Inc. v. IBM Corp."
In Innovation Data Processing, Inc. v. IBM Corp.,
Innovation Data Processing ("Innovation") sued IBM for
allegedly illegally tying two of its software products. 92 Innovation
developed the Fast Dump Restore ("FDR") program, which
competed with IBM's Data Facilities Data Set Services
1980) (per curium) (affirming based on the authority of California Computer
Products, Inc. v. IBM Corp., 613 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1979)); Telex Corp. v. IBM
Corp., 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1975) (holding that IBM's actions, including
making third-party disk drives incompatible with new CPUs, did not violate
the Sherman Act).
a Transamerica,698 F.2d at 1383.
86 Id.

"In re IBM Peripheral EDP Devices Antitrust Litigation, 481 F. Supp.
965, 1007-08 (N.D. Cal. 1979).
8 Transamerica,698 F.2d at 1383.
89 Id.

'oId. at 1382 (emphasis added).
" Innovation Data Processing, Inc. v. IBM Corp., 585 F. Supp. 1470
(D.N.J. 1984).
92

Id. at 1471.
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("DFDSS") program." DFDSS and FDR enabled the backup and
restoration of computer data between computer disks and tapes.94
Additionally, DFDSS enabled users to install IBM's Multiple
Virtual System ("MVS") operating system directly from a backup
tape and without the aid of an additional operating system.95
IBM offered DFDSS either separately or bundled together with
the latest version of a package of optional operating system
programs called Installation Productivity Option ("IPO"). 96
Innovation alleged that this bundling of DFDSS was an illegal
tying arrangement.9 7
The district court held that there was no illegal tying
arrangement for two reasons. First, based on the facts presented,
IBM customers were able to purchase either DFDSS or IPO
separately, as IBM offered an IPO bundle that allowed the
customer to cancel the DFDSS license at any time and pay only
for the period of usage. Second, the court held that there was no
illegal tying arrangement because the latest version of IPO
constituted a lawful package of interrelated components.9 9
DFDSS was the only program that could load a certain type of
tape onto a disk without the assistance of a preexisting operating
system, and thus the court held that IBM would have been
justified in exclusively bundling DFDSS with IPO because of this
unique feature. 00 While the court granted IBM's motion for
summary judgment as to a per se illegal tying arrangement, it did
not grant IBM's motion for summary judgment as to a rule of
reason tying theory due to genuine issues of material fact as to
that claim."o'
Innovation Data Processingis an early example of another
type of predatory innovation claim: whether a product design
that bundles preexisting, separate products represents a
technology tie that is illegal, or whether it represents a legitimate
product improvement whose effect is to eliminate a previously
separate product market. Such claims were at the forefront of the
DOJ's investigation of Microsoft's inclusion of its browser into
93

9

Id.
Id. at 1472.

* Id. at 1472-73.
96 Id.
at 1473.

Id. at 1474.
9 Id. at 1475.
97

*1Id. at 1476.
*0 Id.
101Id. at 1476-17.
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the Windows OS described below.
E. Caldera,Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.1 02
In Caldera, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., Caldera sued
Microsoft for allegedly anticompetitive conduct involving
Microsoft's MS-DOS and Windows operating systems. In 1996,
Caldera acquired Digital Research, Inc. ("DRI"), which up until
1994 developed the DR DOS operating system, a competitor to
Microsoft's MS-DOS operating system.10 By 1988, Microsoft
had obtained a monopoly position in the DOS market with MSDOS." In 1987, DRI developed DR DOS, a direct competitor to
MS-DOS that was compatible with programs written for MSDOS and included many additional features not available in MSDOS."' Caldera claimed that once Microsoft perceived DR DOS
as a threat to its dominant position in the DOS market, it engaged
in a series of anticompetitive acts to exclude DR DOS from the
market. 0
Specifically, Caldera made five allegations. First, that
Microsoft distributed false and misleading announcements about
forthcoming Microsoft OS products .(a practice called
"vaporware"o10) to delay consumer adoption (and awareness) of
DR DOS. Second, that Microsoft engaged in anticompetitive
equipment
original
to discourage
practices
licensing
manufacturers ("OEMs") from including DR DOS with their
systems. Third, that Microsoft intentionally engineered its
Windows OS to be incompatible with DR DOS for the sole
purpose of eliminating DR DOS as a competitor. Fourth, that
Microsoft excluded DRI from its Windows beta testing process
(in which it had previously been included) to prevent DRI from
making DR DOS compatible with the latest version of Windows
prior to launch. And fifth, that Microsoft combined its Windows
and DOS products together with Windows 95 to eliminate the
market for a separate DOS operating system.'os
Microsoft moved for partial summary judgment on the
102Caldera, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 72 F. Supp. 2d 1295 (D. Utah 1999).
103Id. at 1298, 1305.
'n Id. at 1298.
1os Id.

Id. at 1299.
See generally Acufia-Quiroga, supra note 10, at 25-26 (describing
vaporware).
108 Caldera, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 1299-305.
106

107
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issues of incompatibility, DRI's exclusion from the beta testing
process, and illegal tying.10 9 As to incompatibility, Caldera
alleged that Microsoft inserted various detection devices that
disabled either the installation or operation of Windows if any
version of DOS other than MS-DOS was detected.110
Additionally, Caldera alleged that Microsoft intentionally created
other incompatibilities between DR DOS and Windows, and put
software locks into three of its products in the Korean market
that prevented users from running these programs with DR
DOS."' In evaluating these claims, the court concluded that they
must be viewed in context with Caldera's other allegations of
anticompetitive conduct, including its claim that Microsoft
excluded DRI from Windows beta testing so that DRI could not
fix compatibility issues.'12 While the court held that Microsoft
did not have an absolute duty to predisclose its Windows OS to
competitors, its decision to exclude DRI after it had previously
included DRI could be considered as part of the alleged overall
scheme to exclude DR DOS from the market." Thus, the court
denied Microsoft's summary judgment motion as to the
incompatibility and beta testing exclusion issues. 114
With regards to tying, Caldera alleged that Microsoft
combined MS-DOS and Windows into one product under the
Windows 95 OS, even though Windows 95 could be separated
into its separate DOS and Windows components; and the
combined product offered no significant technological benefits
over the separate products. 1 5 The court held that the appropriate
standard for evaluating the technological tying claim was
whether "a valid, not insignificant, technological improvement
has been achieved by the integration of two products," such that
a new product has been created.'16 Additionally, the court held
that the two products must have been joined for technological
reasons and the technological improvements must have
Finally, the court held that to
demonstrated efficiencies."'
succeed in a tying claim, the plaintiff must show that there is

10'

Id. at 1309.

110 Id. at 1310-12.

Id.
Id. at
n1 Id. at
114 Id. at
"' Id. at
116 Id. at
"' Id. at
112

1313.
1317-18.
1314, 1318, 1319.
1319-20.

1325.
1325-26.
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sufficient consumer demand such that the defendant could
efficiently provide the tied products separately."' In applying
these rules to Caldera's allegations, the court held that based on
the opinion of Caldera's expert testimony that Windows 95 was
just an update of Windows and MS-DOS, that the products could
be separated, that Windows 95's improvements were not a result
of integration, and that a market would exist for the separate
products if they had not been integrated, a genuine issue of
material fact existed as to whether the integration of Windows
and MS-DOS created a valid, not insignificant technological
Thus, the court also denied Microsoft's
improvement.'19
summary judgment motion as to Caldera's tying claim.' 20
Caldera and Microsoft ultimately settled their antitrust
dispute prior to the resolution of the case on the merits.
Nevertheless, the Caldera opinion is important because it
affirmed the balancing test for product improvement allegations.
It held that the "standard" for such claims "contemplates the
effect the design choice has on competition. It does not impose
the much heavier burden on a plaintiff of demonstrating that a
design choice is entirely devoid of technological merit."' 2
F. United States v. Microsoft Corp.'22
In United States v. Microsoft Corp., the United States and
several states sued Microsoft for monopolizing the Intelcompatible PC operating systems market, for attempting to
monopolize the Internet browser market, and for illegally tying
its Internet browser, Internet Explorer ("IE"), to its Windows
OS. 23 As part of the attempted monopolization claim, the
plaintiffs alleged that Microsoft technically integrated IE into
Windows to increase its market share in the Internet browser
market.'2 4 Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that Microsoft: (1)
excluded IE from the "Add/Remove Programs" utility, thus
providing no easy method to uninstall IE; (2) designed Windows
so that even if a user installed another Internet browser and set it
Id. at 1327 (quoting Eastman Kodak v. Image Tech. Servs., 504 U.S.
451, 462 (1992)).
119
120

121
122

123
124

Id.
Id. at 1328.
Id. at 1313.
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
Id. at 45.
Id. at 64.
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as the default, certain functions of Windows would still require
IE; and (3) integrated IE code with OS code such that attempting
to delete all of the files used by IE would cripple Windows.1 25
Before evaluating each of the alleged anticompetitive
integrations, the DC Circuit held that "[a]s a general rule, courts
are properly very skeptical about claims that competition has
been harmed by a dominant firm's product design changes."126
Additionally, the court held that this rule was even truer in a
market that was rapidly changing, such as the one at issue.'27
Nevertheless, the court held that judicial deference to a product
innovation does not mean a monopolist's product design changes
are per se lawful.'" Applying this standard to the challenged
conduct, the court held that Microsoft's conduct was
anticompetitive: (1) Microsoft's exclusion of IE from the
Add/Remove Programs utility, which had previously included IE,
increased Microsoft's Internet browser share through means
other than competition on the merits; (2) Microsoft's override of a
user's default Internet browser settings deterred customers from
using a browser other than IE; and (3) Microsoft's integration of
Windows and IE code deterred computer manufacturers from
pre-installing rival Internet browsers, thereby reducing the rivals'
share. 129
The court then went on to evaluate whether there were
any procompetitive justifications for the integrations that
outweighed their anticompetitive effects. As to Microsoft's
exclusion of IE from the Add/Remove Programs utility and the
commingling of Windows and IE code, the court held that both
of these actions constituted exclusionary conduct because
Microsoft did not offer any procompetitive justifications for its
actions.'3 0 As to the default Internet browser setting override,
Microsoft argued that this integration was necessary because
certain Windows features, such as the Windows Update feature,
the Windows 98 Help system, and integrated web browsing in
Windows Explorer, would not function properly unless using IE
with its exclusive ActiveX controls.'' The court held that, given
Id. at 64-65.
Id. at 65 (citing Foremost Pro Color, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 703
F.2d 534, 544-45 (9th Cir. 1983)).
125
126

1"
128
129

Id. at 65.

Id.
Id. at 65-66.

Io Id. at 66-67.
131

Id. at 67.
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these justifications, the burden was then on the plaintiffs to offer
a rebuttal and demonstrate that the anticompetitive effect of the
challenged conduct outweighed the proffered benefit.132 Because
the plaintiffs did not meet this burden, the court held that
Microsoft could not be held liable for this aspect of its product
design.13

Finally, the plaintiffs also challenged Microsoft's conduct
with respect to Java, a type of middleware that allows software
programmers to potentially develop programs across a variety of
operating platforms.1 34 The plaintiffs alleged, with respect to
Java, that Microsoft designed Java Virtual Machine ("JVM"))3 5
such that it was incompatible with the JVM developed by Sun
Microsystems, thus creating interoperability problems for
programs designed for one JVM, but not the other. 3 1 The court
held that "[i]n order to violate the antitrust laws, the incompatible
product must have an anticompetitive effect that outweighs any
procompetitive justification for the design.".13 While Microsoft's
JVM did create interoperability issues, it also allowed
applications to run faster, and the court held that it did not have
any anticompetitive effect on its own." Therefore, the court held
that Microsoft could not be held liable for the development and
promotion of its JVM. 3 1
The Microsoft decision is the seminal decision with regard
to claims of anticompetitive product redesign. The court was
properly "skeptical" of such claims, but also recognized that the
appropriate test under Section 2 must be to analyze the ultimate
effect of an anticompetitive act on consumer welfare, including
those claims related to innovations designed to harm competition.

132

1
13

Id.
Id.
Id. at 74.

1s A JVM is an operating system specific program that translates Java
code into byte code that the underlying operating system can understand. Id.
136

Id.

1" Id.
138

at 75.

Id.

139 Id.
In Microsoft, the court gave substantial deference to Microsoft
where it proffered a justification for its conduct, namely with regard to Java
and the IE default overrides. The court did not articulate how it balanced the
justification against the exclusionary effect of such conduct, or whether it did
balance them at all. We can only assume that the DOJ failed to meet its
burden on these issues.
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G. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.140
In Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., Berkey
Photo, Inc. ("Berkey") alleged that Eastman Kodak Co. ("Kodak")
violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act by willfully maintaining its
monopoly power in the film, color print paper, and camera
markets, and violated Section 1 by conspiring with flashlamp
manufacturers.141 Many of Berkey's claims arose out of Kodak's
introduction of its 110 photographic system, which included a
new type of pocket camera and an improved, compatible color
film.14 2 The new film was created to facilitate creating clear color
prints from the smaller negatives produced by the new film
format.143 The new film, however, required a new photofinishing
process that was incompatible with the older process.14 4
With regard to the claims involving predatory innovation,
Berkey made several allegations. First, Berkey alleged that
Kodak failed to sufficiently predisclose its new camera system to
competitors, and that this conduct was anticompetitive.145 The
Second Circuit held that, although Kodak had disclosed new
innovations in the past, "as a matter of law, Kodak did not have a
duty to predisclose information about the 110 system to
competing camera manufacturers" because "[t]he first firm, even
a monopolist, to design a new camera format has a right to the
lead time that follows from its success."14 6
Second, Berkey alleged that Kodak's practice of
marketing its new 110 film along with its 110 camera was
anticompetitive because the new film, with its new photofinishing
process, was unnecessary to produce adequate photographs with
the 110 camera.147 The court, however, disagreed, holding that
"any firm, even a monopolist, may generally bring its products to
market whenever and however it chooses,"1 4 8 and adding, "[t]his
is not to say, of course, that new product introductions are ipso
facto immune from antitrust scrutiny, . . . in all such cases . .. it is
not the product introduction itself, but some associated conduct,
"0 Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979).
.' Id. at 267.
142 Id.
at 268.

Id. at
Id.
145 Id. at
146 Id. at
147 Id. at
143

277.

144

148

Id.

279-81.
281, 283.
286.
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that supplies the violation."'4 9 The court further held that "[ilf a
monopolist's products gain acceptance in the market, therefore, it
is of no importance that a judge or jury may later regard them as
inferior, so long as that success was not based on any form of
coercion."'so Because the court could not find any evidence that
consumers were coerced into purchasing the new 110 camera
system, the court held that Kodak's marketing and selling of its
110 camera and film together was not anticompetitive.'s
Third, Berkey alleged that Kodak's restriction of its
improved 110 film to its 110 camera was anticompetitive. 5 2 The
court, however, ruled that Berkey failed to "demonstrate that
some consumers who would have bought a Berkey camera were
dissuaded from doing so because [the new film] was available
Thus, the court rejected Berkey's
only in the 110 format."'5
argument solely for lacking evidence of damages, and explicitly
did not rule on whether Kodak's restriction of the 110 film to the
110 camera was anticompetitive.15 4
H. Abbott Laboratoriesv. Teva Pharmaceuticals(In re Tricor
Antitrust Litigation)'s
In Abbott Laboratories v. Teva Pharmaceuticals,several
plaintiffs, including Teva Pharmaceuticals ("Teva"), sued Abbott
Laboratories ("Abbott") and Fournier Industrie et Sante
("Fournier") for antitrust violations stemming from the
defendants' reformulations of the branded drug Tricor.'5 6 The
antitrust claims were originally asserted as counterclaims to
patent infringement litigation surrounding the introduction of
generic equivalents to the defendants' drug, Tricor.5 7
To summarize the nature of the challenged predatory
conduct, a brief description of the generic drug approval process
is necessary. The FDA must approve new drugs before they can
be-introduced to the market."ss Approved drugs, along with their
149

Id. at 286 n.30.

s Id. at 287.
"' Id. at 287-88.

Id. at 288.
Id.
154 Id. at 288-89.
us Abbott Lab. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 408 (D. Del.
2006).
152

153

156

Id. at 413-14.

157
158

Id. at 417.
Id. at 414.
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applicable patent numbers and expiration dates, if any, are listed
For the generic
in the FDA's so-called Orange Book.'"
equivalents of previously approved branded drugs, the HatchWaxman Act provides an Abbreviated New Drug Application
("ANDA") process whereby a generic manufacturer can
incorporate the safety and efficacy data of the branded drug into
its application if it can prove that its generic drug is the
bioequivalent of the branded drug.16 0 As part of the ANDA, the
generic drug manufacturer must make one of four certifications
regarding the patent or patents relevant to the branded drug.16 1
One common certification, a "paragraph IV" certification, and the
one applicable in this case, is that the relevant patent or patents
are either invalid or will not be infringed by the generic drug.162
The filing of a paragraph IV certification triggers an act of patent
infringement, for which the patent holder has forty-five days to
If the patent holder subsequently files an
respond. 6 1
infringement suit, approval of the ANDA is stayed until either
thirty months have passed or a court has ruled on the validity
and infringement of the patent.164 If the generic drug is ultimately
approved, then pharmacists may substitute the generic version of
a prescribed branded drug if the generic drug has been "ABrated" by the FDA.1 6s A drug can be AB-rated if it is both the
bioequivalent of the branded drug, and is also available in the
same form, dosage, and strength.16 6
The plaintiffs alleged that, in response to ANDA filings by
Teva for generic versions of the drug Tricor, the defendants
reformulated the drug during the automatic stay period and
pulled the older version of the drug off the market so that they
could maintain their monopoly in the market for Tricor.167 The
plaintiffs alleged that the defendants reformulated Tricor twice:
once from capsule to tablet form in response to an ANDA for the
capsule form, and again from that tablet form to a slightly
different tablet form in response to an ANDA for the first tablet

"
160

Id.
Id.

Id.
Id.
16 Id. at 414-15.
164 Id. at 415.
165 Id.
161
162

166

Id.

167

Id.
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form.168 Additionally, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants
pulled the capsule and first tablet forms from the market to
Although Teva eventually
prevent generic substitution.16 9
prevailed in the patent infringement actions brought in response
to the ANDA filings, it was not able to effectively market
replacement generic versions of Tricor because the defendants
had pulled the branded versions of Tricor to be replaced from the
market during the mandatory stay period.7 0
The district court denied the defendants' motion to
dismiss the plaintiffs' antitrust claims."' With regard to the
plaintiffs' claims based on the defendants' Tricor reformulations,
the court held that the defendants' conduct should be evaluated
under the rule of reason, such that the anticompetitive effects of
the reformulation are weighed against any procompetitive
While the defendants cited benefits from the
benefits. 2
reformulations, such as a proposed new indication for the first
tablet, and the proposed removal of a food requirement for the
second tablet, the court did not consider these contested benefits
at the motion to dismiss stage because it ruled that the plaintiffs
had not admitted these benefits." Thus, the court, following the
Microsoft opinion, upheld the plaintiffs' monopolization claims
because the reformulations and product withdrawals resulted in a
substantial foreclosure of the Tricor market, with no significant

medical benefits. 174
I. In re Intel Corp.175
In December 2009, the FTC filed a complaint against Intel
alleging various anticompetitive activities in violation of Section
5 of the FTC Act." 6 The FTC alleged that Intel committed acts
constituting unfair methods of competition generally, that Intel
monopolized and attempted to monopolize the relevant markets,
and that Intel engaged in unfair or deceptive acts or practices.1 77
The relevant markets alleged by the FTC were the worldwide
168
169
17o
171
172

Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

416, 418.
416.
434.
422.

17 Id. at 423.
174

17s
176
1'

Id.
Intel Corp., No. 9341 (F.T.C. 2009).
Complaint at
97-106, Intel Corp., No. 9341 (F.T.C. 2009).
Id.
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markets, and related submarkets, for CPUs and graphics
processing units ("GPUs").1 78
In addition to marketing, advertising, and other conduct,
the FTC challenged two instances of Intel's conduct relevant to
predatory design change. First, the FTC alleged that Intel
redesigned software products, such as compilers and libraries, to
undercut the performance advantage of non-Intel x86 CPUs
7
The FTC alleged that this software
relative to Intel x86 CPUs.'"
redesign had no sufficiently justifiable technological benefit, and
that Intel misrepresented the reasons for software performance
discrepancies between Intel and non-Intel x86 CPUs. 80 Second,
the FTC alleged that, while Intel at first allowed free
interopeiability between Intel CPUs and third-party GPUs, and
after having induced GPU firms to share their technology with
Intel, Intel more recently created interoperability obstacles
between Intel CPUs and non-Intel GPUs to enhance its monopoly
position in the relevant CPU markets, and to potentially obtain
monopoly power in the relevant GPU markets."' The FTC
alleged that this conduct was intended to slow or prevent nonIntel GPUs from displacing many of the functions performed by
CPUs, and thus inhibit the ability of GPUs to become a
competing product of CPUs.18 2 The FTC also alleged that this
conduct had no sufficient or legitimate business justification.'"
In August, 2010, the FTC issued a consent decree in the
Intel case.' 84 In Section V of the consent decree, the FTC
addressed the issue of Intel's alleged predatory redesigns by
ordering that Intel may not make any engineering or design
change to a product covered by the decree if that change (1)
degrades the performance of a competing product and (2) does
not provide an "actual" benefit to Intel's product.' The consent
decree also stated that it will be Intel's burden to demonstrate
that any change at issue meets these requirements.'8 6
The FTC provided further explanation of the
178 Id. at

32-40.

Id. at 56. Compilers translate high-level computer source code into
lower level object code, while libraries are collections of code that can be
incorporated into a program by reference.
180 Id. at l 59-61.
171

18
182

Id. at

Id.
183 Id. at

80-91.

91.

1841Decision and Order, Intel Corp., No. 9341 (F.T.C. 2010).
185

Id. § V.A.

'86 id.
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requirements of the consent decree in the accompanying Analysis
of Proposed Consent Order to Aid Public Comment."' The FTC
explained that "[t]he Proposed Consent Order would be violated
if a design change degrades performance of a competitive or
complementary product and Intel fails to demonstrate an actual
benefit to the Intel product at issue." 8 Notably, the FTC
explicitly did not require a weighing of the anticompetitive harms
against the benefits of a particular design change; "it is sufficient
that there be actual benefits."8 9 Rejecting the approach taken in
Allied Orthopedic, the FTC explained that "[a] balancing test
would be appropriate in a legal challenge to an Intel design
change under Section 5 of the FTC Act or Section 2 of the
Sherman Act.""
V. What Test Should Apply to PredatoryRedesign Where Such
Redesign Is Claimed to Be an "Innovation"?
The Allied Orthopedictest is incorrect. If it was the law of
the land, then anticompetitive conduct, such as the conduct at
issue in United States v. Microsoft, would not constitute a valid
claim if it generated even minimal efficiency or improvement.
Innovation through redesign can marginally improve a product,
but with overriding damage to the competitive process.
Changing a capsule form drug to a tablet form drug may be an
"improvement," but where the effect of such change is to foreclose
generic drug competition, it is appropriate for a court to conclude
that on balance such an improvement is exclusionary, even if it is
"innovative."
Likewise, minor improvements in power
consumption are "innovations" in the most basic sense, but when
coupled with a substantial change in interconnects, such that
competitor products can no longer interoperate with a processor,
such "innovation" can be unnecessarily and unlawfully
exclusionary.
Given that the Allied Orthopedic test will lead to
substantial underenforcement, what then is a viable alternative to
the test in Allied Orthopedic? There are three tests that are often
discussed: (1) the profit sacrifice test; (2) the no economic sense
test; and (3) the rule-of-reason balancing test or consumer welfare
See generally Analysis of Agreement Containing Consent Order to Aid
Public8 Comment, 75 Fed. Reg. 48338 (Aug. 10, 2010).
1 Id. at 48345.
187

189 Id.
190 Id.
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test. We address each, in turn.
A. Profit Sacrifice Test
Janusz Ordover and Robert Willig introduced the concept
of using the profit sacrifice test for predatory innovation in
1981,191 and it has attracted several well-known proponents over

According to the profit sacrifice proponents,
the years. 192
"predatory objectives are present if a practice would be
unprofitable without the exit that it causes, but are profitable
The profit sacrifice test does not balance
with the exit.""
"market-wide costs and benefits of the conduct at issue," instead,
"the sacrifice test asks a different question,

. .

. whether the

allegedly anticompetitive conduct would be profitable for the
defendant and would make good business sense even if it did not
exclude rivals and thereby create or preserve market power for
the defendant." 194 Proponents advocate it because:
[It] provides simple and meaningful guidance to firms to
enable them to know how to avoid antitrust liability
without steering clear of procompetitive conduct. If
antitrust law explicitly embraced the sacrifice test for
exclusionary conduct, firms would be able to comply
with the law simply by determining whether their
contemplated conduct would make good business sense
even if the conduct did not increase their market
power. *

The test, like the no economic sense test described below,
fails in several significant regards with respect to predatory
innovation/redesign. First, the test can lead to underenforcement
in that it will fail to condemn exclusionary redesign that is
virtually (if not entirely) costless. For example, a firm with
durable market power in the operating system market could
make its operating system work more quickly by altering
interoperability protocols to deny all third parties the ability to
91 Janusz A. Ordover & Robert D. Willig, An Economic Definition of
Predation:Pricingand ProductInnovation, 91 YALE L.J. 8 (1981).
"' See, e.g., A. Douglas Melamed, Exclusionary Conduct Under the
Antitrust Laws: Balancing, Sacrifice, and Refusals to Deal, 20 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1247 (2005).
193 Ordover & Willig, supra note 191, at 9.
194 Melamed, supra note 192, at 1255.
195 Id. at 1257.
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hook into its application programming interfaces. While this
could result in a modest improvement in OS speed, it also
excludes competitors from developing software that can be used
with the OS and thus reduces consumers' options.
While most criticisms regarding the profit sacrifice test in
the context of Section 2 generally relate to its potential to generate
too many false negatives and thus inappropriately immunize
anticompetitive conduct, in the context of predatory innovation,
the test also can fail because it cannot account for the primary
effect of innovation itself, which is, definitionally, a short-term
profit sacrifice. As Richard Gilbert explained:
Innovation is about sacrificing short-term profits for
long-term rewards. A firm incurs costs that reduce
profits in the short run in order to develop new products
or processes that generate profits in the longer run. It is
[therefore] difficult to determine when the sacrifice of
short-run profit by investing in R&D is excessive."
The profit sacrifice test can result in potential overenforcement in another way as weH. Specifically, innovation
causes exit, particularly disruptive innovation. Thus, IBM's
decision to invest in research and development to integrate its
hard drive within the computer frame was an unmistakable
innovation that (a) likely caused a short-term profit sacrifice, and
(b) caused competitors of external hard drives to exit.19 7 Yet, that
innovation was not anticompetitive.
The main problem with the profit sacrifice test is that it
focuses almost exclusively on the defendant as opposed to the
consumer. This is why the profit sacrifice test often fails to
properly judge whether behavior is anticompetitive. It does not
examine the effect on consumer welfare, which is, after all, the
lynchpin of antitrust analysis.
B. No Economic Sense Test / Sham Innovation Test
In many respects, the no economic sense test is closely
related to the profit sacrifice test, although, at the margin,
proponents of each test believe that the other is in some way

"6 Richard Gilbert, Holding Innovation to an Antitrust Standard, 3
COMPETITION POLICY INT'L 47, 57-58 (2007).

"1 Id. at 63.
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As one leading proponent of the no economic sense
inferior."
test explained, "[c]onduct is not exclusionary or predatory unless
it would make no economic sense for the defendant but for the
tendency to eliminate or lessen competition."'
The no economic sense test is different from the profit
sacrifice test in one critical regard: it does not ask whether the
conduct at issue resulted in a short-term profit sacrifice, rather it
looks at the conduct as a whole, over time. Thus, the no
economic sense test does not have the same shortcoming as the
profit sacrifice test described above, because it is not concerned
with whether a firm reduced profits in the short.term, even if the
innovation ultimately did not produce a positive return. Thus, in
such instances, the danger of over-enforcement is mitigated, as a
putative defendant need not justify short-term R&D investments
that did not result in corresponding product improvements (after
all, not all innovation is successful).
If, on the other hand, one were to define the contours of
the no economic sense test to mean that innovation always makes
economic sense, regardless of how minimal it is, then the no
economic sense test, in such a construct is really no different than
the Allied Orthopedic decision, and only sham innovation would
be prohibited under Section 2. As noted by Richard Gilbert, such
a test would ask only "whether the innovation makes at least
some consumers better off. If it does, it is not a sham." 20 0 While
easier to apply than the profit sacrifice test, like the Allied
Orthopedic decision, it likely will result in substantial underenforcement of the law. A test that only judges whether a
challenged innovation is a complete sham will necessarily fail to
identify those instances where a product redesign has minimal
justification that contributes significantly to a degradation in
consumer welfare.
C. United States v. Microsoft Test
The radical departure from well-developed Section 2
See, e.g., Andrew I. Gavil, Exclusionary Distribution Strategies by
Dominant Firms: Striking a Better Balance, 72 ANTITRUST L. J. 3, 52-58
(2004) (discussing the profit sacrifice test and no economic sense test (labeled
the "but for" test), among others); see also Salop, supra note 15 (criticizing both
tests and advocating a test focused on consumer welfare).
' Gregory J. Werden, Identifying Exclusionary Conduct under Section 2:
The "No Economic Sense" Test, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 413, 413, 417 (2006).
198

0

Gilbert, supra note 196, at 62.
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jurisprudence in the Allied Orthopedic decision was not justified.
The appropriate test by which to judge the legality of product
redesign is the basic rule of reason as articulated by the Microsoft
decision - in other words, an examination of the redesign's effect
on consumer welfare. It is the same test used to examine other
vertical and horizontal restraints, and essentially the test
employed in analyzing mergers. The test as articulated by the
D.C. Circuit is straightforward.
A first step in every case is for the plaintiff to make out a
prima facie case of competitive harm. A prima facie case will
typically have two components:
1. There must be proof of market power (or a probability
that market power will be acquired) in a relevant
market.2 01 Without market power, and the ability to
harm consumer welfare, conduct cannot violate
Section 2.202

2. The plaintiff must show that the redesign impairs
rivals and, as a result, lessens the constraints on the
defendant's market power. The relevant inquiry in
this respect is whether, as a result of the impairment,
the defendant has an enhanced ability to raise prices or
limit choice or quality.20 Where there has been an
impairment of rivals sufficient to harm consumers that
is not a necessary outcome of the competitive process, a
primafacie case has been established.
Once a prima facie case has been established, then the
burden shifts to the defendant to proffer a procompetitive
justification for its conduct. The types of justifications that are
cognizable in this context are those that offer the prospect of
higher quality, lower prices, greater output, and other benefits to
consumers.
Once the defendant has met its burden of production,-the
201 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 69 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en
banc), see also Heerwagen v. Clear Channel Commc'ns, 435 F.3d 219, 227-29
(2d Cir. 2006) (Sherman Act § 2); United States v. Visa U.S.A, Inc., 344 F.3d
229, 238 (2d Cir. 2003) (Sherman Act § 1),-cert. denied, 543 U.S. 811 (2004).
202 See, e.g., Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 458-59
(1993).
& Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive
203 Thomas G. Krattenmaker
Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE L.J.
209, 236-38 (1986).
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burden shifts back to the plaintiff to rebut the proffered
justification or, if the justification stands unrebutted, then the
plaintiff must demonstrate that the anticompetitive harm of the
conduct outweighs the procompetitive benefit.
Most cases will be resolved prior to the balancing of harm
versus benefit. The plaintiff may fail to present a prima facie
case. The defendant may not be able to demonstrate cognizable,
non-pretextual efficiencies. However, in cases like Microsoft,
Tricor, and Bard, an assessment of magnitudes and
In those rare
corresponding balancing becomes necessary.
instances, the question will be whether the net effect of
competition is substantially adverse. Only where the net effect,
taking efficiencies into account, is to create a likelihood of
increased prices, lower output, or reduced quality, should the
challenged redesign be found unlawful.2 04
Complaints that such a test is not easily administered fall
flat. As cogently explained by Steve Salop:
In carrying out this analysis, the courts would not
engage in self-conscious, open-ended balancing of the
magnitudes of benefits and harms using some subjective
social weighting. . . . The finder of fact generally would

compare and weigh the magnitude and credibility of
and
the
procompetitive
on
both
evidence
anticompetitive sides to evaluate which evidence is
stronger on balance. Juries routinely weigh the
credibility of opposing experts with differing views of
the net effect of the challenged conduct. Alternatively,
instead of formally comparing the effect on price and
quality impacts of the increased market power with the
lower costs and superior product performance, a court
may reach the same result by setting the competitive
benefits standard higher the greater are the market
power harms shown. For example, in a case in which
the plaintiff has shown significant market power harms,
the court may be more likely to find that the defendant
has failed to demonstrate its benefits claims.2 05
Salop's analysis is not unusual, or new, or different. It is the
same analysis courts have applied for years in rule of reason cases
20 See Jonathan M. Jacobson, Exclusive Dealing, "Foreclosure," and
Consumer Harm, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 311, 365-69 (2002).
205 Salop, supra note 15, at 331-32.
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under both Section 1 and Section 2.206 It is fundamentally the
same test that the courts and agencies apply almost every day in
determining whether a merger violates Section 7 of the Clayton
Act, a process that necessarily involves a determination whether
the net effect of the transaction is to raise prices.20 i
VI. Conclusion
While innovation is appropriately granted deference under
the antitrust laws because of its ability to generate significant
procompetitive benefits, courts must be wary of anticompetitive
conduct dressed up as "innovation" that harms competition while
providing no material benefit to consumers. When confronted
with allegations of predatory innovation, courts should apply the
D.C. Circuit's consumer welfare balancing test in Microsoft, and
not the per se rule protecting redesign established by the Ninth
Circuit in Allied Orthopedic. While other tests also exist, such as
the "profit sacrifice test" and the "no economic sense test," both
suffer from encouraging either over- or underenforcement. The
Microsoft test applies a time-tested approach to ensuring that the
focus of the inquiry is appropriately on consumer welfare, and
thus should be applied to ensure that the significant potential
benefits of innovation are appropriately weighed against any
alleged competitive harms.

206

See Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 58-59 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc) (Section 2);

ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 57-58

(6th ed. 2007) (Section 1). As the Second Circuit noted in K.M.B. Warehouse
Distributors v. Walker Manufacturing Co., 61 F.3d 123, 127 (2d Cir. 1995):
("Establishing a violation of the rule of reason involves three steps. '[P]laintiff
bears the initial burden of showing that the challenged action has had an
actual adverse effect on competition as a whole in the relevant market. . . .'
(citation omitted). If the plaintiff succeeds, the burden shifts to the defendant
to establish the 'pro-competitive "redeeming virtues"' of the action. (citation
omitted).Should the defendant carry this burden, the plaintiff must then show
that the same pro-competitive effect could be achieved through an alternative
means that is less restrictive of competition." (citation omitted)).
207 See, e.g., FTC v. Swedish Match, 131 F. Supp. 2d 151 (D.D.C. 2000);
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGER

GUIDELINES § 4 (1992) (with Apr. 8, 1997 revisions to § 4 on efficiencies),
available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg.pdf.

